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Despite recent reforms, world agricultural markets remain highly distorted by 
government policies. Traditional indicators of agricultural and food price distortions 
such as producer and consumer support estimates (PSEs and CSEs) can be poor 
guides to the policies’ trade effects. Two recent studies provide much better indicators 
of trade- (and welfare-)reducing effects of farm price and trade policies, but they 
provide somewhat differing numbers. This paper explains why those estimates differ 
and how they might be improved for use in on-going annual monitoring of the trade 
restrictiveness of agricultural policies in both high-incmoe and developing countries. 
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World markets are far less integrated for agricultural products than for other goods. In 
2004, for example, the share of global production exported (excluding intra-European 
Union trade) was only 8 percent for agricultural and food products compared with 31 
percent for other primary products and 25 percent for manufactured goods. Trade 
negotiators and policy advisors are keen to know the extent to which agricultural 
policies are responsible for that low degree of international trade in farm products, as 
an aid to prioritizing negotiating efforts and unilateral policy reform agendas. There 
are various indicators used for that purpose. Perhaps the most common are nominal 
rates of assistance to farmers and related consumer tax equivalents affecting the prices 
that domestic consumers pay for farm products. These indicate the extent to which 
domestic prices exceed those at a country’s border. Similar indicators are the OECD’s 
producer and consumer support estimates (PSEs and CSEs), although they are 
expressed as a percentage of the distorted domestic price rather than the border price. 
More precise results can be obtained using sectoral or economy-wide models, but 
economic models are calibrated to just one particular past year and so are not well 
placed for up-to-date regular monitoring of policies or for examining long historical 
time series. An alternative way to indicate the extent to which trade is reduced is to 
use scalar index numbers from the family of trade restrictiveness indexes. These 
measures provide a single theoretically sound indicator of the trade effects of different 
policy measures that is directly comparable across countries and over time.  
Drawing on the seminal theoretical work of Anderson and Neary (1994, 
2005), two recent World Bank studies have attempted to answer the question of how 
much agricultural policies restrict trade nationally, regionally and globally. Kee, 
Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) estimate, among other indices, a single trade reduction 
index (called an Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index or OTRI in their paper) for 78 




or mid-2000s). Updates of these have been reported regularly in the World Bank’s 
Global Monitoring Report, with estimates for circa 2007 reported in Chapter 5 of 
World Bank (2009), for example. The OTRI has become a World Bank ‘core’ trade 
indicator because it can be generated for many countries every year using regularly 
updated published data from UNCTAD’s TRAINS database. The estimates are based 
on distortions to the import-competing sub-sectors of both agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors due to each of these countries’ import tariffs and non-tariff 
import-restricting measures (NTMs). Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga report separately the 
OTRI for the agricultural sub-sector in each of the countries in their study. 
Anderson and Croser (2009) provide alternative annual estimates of a similar 
index which they call a trade reduction index (abbreviated hereafter as TRI) for the 
agricultural sector of 75 developed and developing countries for the period 1955 to 
2007, using a methodology set out in Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2010). That TRI is 
available separately for the import-competing and exporting sub-sectors as well as for 
the overall agricultural sector of those countries. This alternative set is based on 
sectoral estimates of the nominal rate of assistance to farmers and the consumer tax 
equivalent (NRA and CTE) of domestic and border policy measures that affect each 
country’s agricultural trade. Those NRAs and CTEs, provided by Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008) and summarized in Anderson (2009), are derived by comparing 
domestic prices with prices of like products at a country’s border (see Anderson et al. 
2008 for the detailed methodology). The contributions to the total NRA and CTE, and 
hence to the TRI, of various policy instruments have also been distinguished (Croser 
and Anderson 2010a).
1
In this paper, we compare the results of these two recent contributions by 
World Bank researchers to measuring indicators of trade reductions from agricultural 
policies. We then explore how the two series complement each other and why they 
differ. With those insights, we suggest how estimation of the trade restrictiveness of 
agricultural policy can be improved in the future.  
  
 
                                                 
1 The Anderson and Croser (2009) database also contains estimates of a TRI for the global market of 
individual commodities, based on a methodology reported in Croser, Lloyd and Anderson (2010). 
These measures are novel because all previous work within the trade restrictiveness index literature has 




Two complementary estimates of agricultural trade restrictiveness indexes 
 
We summarize in this section two new sets of estimates of trade indices: the Anderson 
and Croser (2009) country-level TRI estimates (AC), and the Kee, Nicita and 
Olarreaga (2008) OTRI estimates available on the World Bank website (KNO).
2
Figure 2 presents the country level detail from the two studies for 2000–04 
(for which there are 49 countries in common), showing the KNO estimates for the 
agricultural sector OTRI based on import tariffs and NTMs alongside the AC 
estimates of the TRI for the import-competing agricultural subsector, with countries 
ranked according to the AC estimates. In both studies there is considerable diversity 
in the country-level index estimates. In line with the results in Figure 1(a), all high-
income and transition economies have positive index estimates, indicating 
unsurprisingly that farm policies in the import-competing sectors of these economies 
were trade-reducing in that period. There is a high degree of correlation between the 
estimated series in the two studies for many countries, especially the European Union 
 We 
start with the time-series trends in the AC estimates. Figure 1 presents the TRI 
aggregate estimates by AC for the import-competing and exportables sub-sectors and 
the overall agricultural sector for high-income and developing countries from 1960 to 
2004. For developing countries as a group, the trade restrictiveness of agricultural 
policy was slightly increasing until the 1990s. Thereafter it declined, mostly due to 
reductions in Africa and Asia. The aggregate results for developing countries are 
driven by the exportables subsector which has been taxed, and the import-competing 
sub-sector which is being protected but by less than in high-income countries. For 
high-income countries, the TRI time path was similar but the causes differ: policies in 
high-income countries support both exporting and import-competing agricultural 
products and, even though they favour the latter much more heavily, the assistance to 
exporters somewhat offsets the antitrade bias from the protection of import-competing 
products in terms of impacts on those countries’ aggregate volume of trade in farm 
products. This is reflected in Figure 1(a) in a much smaller TRI for high-income 
countries overall for agriculture as compared with that for just the import-competing 
subsector, and the negative values for the exporting subsector.  
                                                 
2 The Kee et al. (2008) estimates are slightly different to those in Kee et al. (2009), but we use the 
former because they include a disaggregation of the OTRI into manufacturing and agricultural sub-




(EU) countries and most of Central and Eastern Europe’s transition economies. (Note 
that the common KNO estimate of the OTRI for member countries of the EU as a 
whole — 49 percent — is allocated to each member country in Figure 2.)  
The differences between the two sets of estimates are most noticeable at the 
top and bottom of Figure 2(a). For the EFTA countries (Switzerland, Iceland and 
Norway) and Japan — countries with a strong comparative disadvantage in 
agricultural products — the AC estimates are much higher than the KNO estimates; 
while for Australia, the United States and New Zealand — countries with a strong 
comparative advantage in farm products — the AC estimates are much smaller than 
the KNO estimates.  
Figure 2(b) presents the estimates for those developing countries present in 
both data sets. Most countries had policies that were overall trade-reducing in the 
time-period shown. For a few developing countries, the TRI estimate by AC is 
negative, indicating that their agricultural policies in aggregate were implicitly 
subsidizing imports slightly. The AC estimates for developing countries are generally 
smaller than the KNO estimates. This tendency holds across the three main 
developing country regions (Africa, Asia and Latin America). There are only a few 
developing countries for which the KNO estimate is lower than the AC estimate, most 
noticeably Ghana and Sri Lanka.     
Because the KNO study has estimates of the OTRI for both agricultural and 
manufacturing sub-sectors of each country, it is possible to gauge from the KNO 
study the relative restrictiveness of trade policy in these two sub-sectors. The results 
in Figure 3 indicate that, with the exception of some African nations and Ukraine, the 
agricultural sector policies are more trade-reducing than those of the manufacturing 
sector in the countries sampled.  
These results are complementary. The AC estimates, based on historical data, 
enable greater insights into the restrictiveness of policy over time. Also, the AC 
estimates for import-competing and exportable sub-sectors give a stronger indication 
of the antitrade policy stance in many countries, especially in previous decades, than 
is obtainable by examining indexes for just the import-competing farm industries. 
Nonetheless, the KNO series has the benefit of being able to be readily updated from 
secondary data as and when UNCTAD’s TRAINS database is revised each year. For 




core trade indicators. Even so, it is important to be aware of why the estimates differ, 
and to explore the scope for improving on these existing measures.  
 
Why the two studies’ estimates differ  
 
There are at least five reasons why the KNO and AC estimates differ. Some are 
empirical, others are methodological.  
The most obvious empirical reason for the series to differ is that the two 
studies take their distortions data are from different sources. In the KNO study, the 
main source of tariff data is the WTO Integrated Data Base and UNCTAD’s TRAINS 
database. NTM data are mostly from TRAINS, supplemented by the WTO’s national 
Trade Policy Review reports. Agricultural domestic support data (which are included 
in the KNO NTM estimate) are based on WTO members’ notifications during the 
period 1995–98. By contrast, the data used in the AC estimates are obtained from the 
World Bank’s new Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database, which provides 
price-equivalent distortion estimates for the production and consumption sides of each 
commodity market based on direct price comparisons. By calculating domestic-to-
border price ratios, the estimates include the price effects of all tariff and non-tariff 
trade measures plus any domestic price support measures (positive or negative), plus 
an adjustment for the output-price equivalent of direct interventions in farm input 
markets. Where multiple exchange rates operate, an estimate of the import or export 
tax equivalents of that distortion are included as well. The domestic-to-border price 
ratio is an appropriate measure for the TRI analysis since it captures agricultural price 
and trade policies by comparing like products at the same point in the value chain, 
namely, the farm-gate level.  
 The different sources of data (and their different years), and the way they are 
used, can potentially explain some of the difference in the estimates. For example, the 
KNO estimates of their OTRI are higher than the TRI estimates by AC for 
agricultural-exporting countries potentially because of the methodology used by KNO 
to capture the effects of NTMs. The KNO method involves (1) estimating the 
restrictiveness of NTMs on import volumes by product and country, and (2) using 
import demand elasticities to transform the estimated import quantity to an ad-
valorem tariff equivalent measure. The former step includes in the estimating equation 




regulation) regardless of the extent of restrictiveness of that measure. For countries 
such as Australia, the United States and New Zealand, almost half of the OTRI 
estimates by KNO are due to NTMs.  
The AC method of domestic-to-border price comparisons for like products at 
the farmgate level of the value chain, by contrast, provides an ad valorem equivalent 
directly. While such measures based on price comparisons are likely to be more 
accurate for covered products, there are many food products imported for consumers 
that are not selected for coverage in the study because they were not important in 
domestic production (see below). Also, generating such measures can be 
computationally intensive, and while efforts are underway to update the Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008) database, such updates are not yet as mainstreamed as the annual 
updates of UNCTAD’s TRAINS database. 
The second reason to expect differences between the two series is that the AC 
estimates are computed with the simplifying assumption within each country that 
domestic price elasticities of supply are equal across commodities, and the same for 
domestic price elasticities of demand. That assumption allows the AC estimates to be 
constructed by aggregating distortions using as weights just the sectoral share of each 
commodity’s domestic value of consumption or production at undistorted prices. 
While this simplification means that the estimates do not fully capture the differential 
responses of various commodity trades to a given policy distortion, sensitivity 
analysis leads AC to expect the assumption to have only a minor effect on their 
overall results. The KNO OTRI estimates, calculated with a full set of country- and 
commodity-specified import demand elasticities, has the benefit of capturing precisely 
the differential responses of various commodity trades to a given policy distortion. 
The third reason to expect differences between the two series is that the KNO 
estimates are generated from a very disaggregated dataset (at the HS six-digit tariff 
line level, which has more than 4000 tariff lines) whereas the AC estimates are based 
on a sample that averages just 15 farm products per high-income country and 9 per 
developing country (so as to cover around 70 percent of the gross value of each 
country’s farm production). If the level of disaggregation had been the only difference 
between the two series so that the product and instrument coverage (see below) were 
the same and the series used the same distortions data, then the greater level of 
disaggregation in the KNO study would result in more-accurate TRI estimates. This is 




disaggregated base, and the estimates reflect the full diversity of distortions across 
industries within the agricultural sub-sector under study. The OTRI for industries 
distorted by import restrictions alone (the KNO approach) would give a higher 
estimate than a comparable TRI estimate by AC because the former would be based 
on data that contain a fuller diversity of distortions across the import-competing sub-
sector.
3
The fourth reason why the two series could differ is the difference in the 
products included in the two studies. The KNO estimates are based on a methodology 
where distortions to just import-competing products are weighted by observed import 
values (multiplied by import demand elasticities, as per the Anderson/Neary 
formulation of the index). That is, the KNO estimates will only include products that 
show up with some imports in the HS six-digit data, regardless of the importance of 
each industry to domestic production or consumption.  
 
By contrast, the AC estimates are computed using a methodology where the 
weights are production and consumption based. From a practical point of view, the 
data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) is such that agricultural products are selected 
for inclusion in the database because they are important contributors to the gross 
value of national production at undistorted prices, thereby minimizing the number of 
products needed to achieve the target coverage of 70 percent of that total value. The 
AC estimates are based on policy distortions to those 70 percent of products, which 
includes for both import-competing and exportable sub-sectors. The TRIs are 
computed for the sub-sectors of import-competing and exportable products separately 
as well as together; and they can be extended to include the nontradables sub-sector as 
well.  
If the only difference between the two series was that KNO limit their sample 
to products facing actual import competition, the AC estimates would give a more 
accurate indication of distortions to the domestic agricultural markets of a country 
because they include both import-competing and export sub-sectors (and potentially 
nontradables). However, the AC estimates could be improved by including more 
coverage of production and consumption beyond the current 70 percent coverage of 
                                                 
3 Another index reported in both the KNO paper and the AC database is a welfare reduction index, for 
which the variance of sectoral distortions is a component of the index. In this case, the more 
disaggregated dataset, which is likely to have a greater variance of distortions, would result in a higher 
welfare reduction index estimate than the estimates using the more aggregated dataset. This is in fact 
what Laborde, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2009) find when they aggregate HS six-digit tariff 




production and somewhat less of consumption on average. At the same time the KNO 
methodology and OTRI estimates could be improved by including exportable 
products.  
The fifth and related reason for the difference between the two series has to do 
with differences in the policy instruments included in the analysis. The KNO 
estimates include only import-restricting policy distortions, whereas the AC estimates 
are based on all distortions (positive and negative) to import-competing and 
exportable industries. That set includes import and export taxes and subsidies and ad 
valorem equivalents of non-price border measures such as quantitative trade 
restrictions or technical standards, and the implicit trade taxes associated with 
multiple exchange rates, as well as domestic production or consumption taxes and 
subsidies and the output subsidy equivalent of farm input subsidies net of input taxes. 
As noted, the AC methodology can be further extended to include domestic 
distortions to the nontradables sub-sector of agriculture also (Croser and Anderson 
2010b). By definition this sub-sector involves no trade distortions, so its inclusion in 
the set of products necessarily will lower the sectoral TRI estimates. 
Differences in the estimated TRI series due to differing extents of product 
disaggregation, product coverage, and instrument coverage are evident from a 
comparison of the KNO estimates with two alternative sets of AC estimates. The first 
comparison is between the KNO estimates and the TRI estimates by AC for import-
competing products in each country (Figure 2). Given the five differences between the 
two series analysed above, it is not possible to say a priori whether the TRI estimates 
by AC should be larger or smaller than the KNO counterparts. For example, whilst the 
latter will include many more products — including ones involving little or no 
restriction because there is no local industry demanding protection from import 
competition – it will only include import restrictions and hence only a subset of 
distortions to agricultural trade (albeit probably the most distortive subset). For high-
income and transitional economies, where almost all import distortions are protective, 
the AC estimates (with fewer sectors) are higher than KNO estimates, most likely 
because the effect of including more lightly protected products dominates. This could 
be partly why temperate-climate countries such as Japan, Switzerland, Norway and 
Iceland, despite having highly protected import-competing agricultural sectors, have 
low OTRIs: many of their imports from tropical countries would face few if any 




implicit import subsidies for staple foods, the lower TRI estimate by AC is lower than 
the OTRI estimate by KNO, suggesting that the effect of including more policy 
instruments dominates the explanation for the difference between the two studies’ 
estimates (Figure 2(b)).  
The second comparison is between the KNO estimates and AC’s TRI 
estimates for all covered tradables (both exportable and import-competing sectors). 
This comparison brings the two series closer together in terms of product coverage, 
but the AC estimates also include distortions to exportable industries. Once again it is 
not possible to say a priori whether the AC estimates should be larger or smaller than 
the KNO estimates. The extent to which the increased product coverage in the AC 
estimates brings them closer to the KNO estimates will depend on the type and extent 
of distortions to exportable versus import-competing sub-sectors. A comparison and 
Figures 2 and 4 reveals that when exportable sub-sectors are included to generate a 
TRI for all agricultural tradables, the TRI estimates generally are lower in 2000–04 
than those involving just import-competing sub-sectors. This is because the 
exportable sub-sector tends to be less trade restricted than the import-competing sub-
sector. For example, Switzerland and Iceland have large export subsidies in 2000–04 
for several agricultural products (Josling 2009). These trade-expanding subsidies 
reduce the TRI estimate quite significantly when the exportable sub-sector is 
included. In contrast, Norway provides much lower assistance to its exportable sub-
sector than to its import-competing farmers, so the inclusion of exporting industries 
has a less significant effect on that country’s TRI estimate (compare the grey shaded 
bar for Norway in Figures 2 and 4). As for developing countries, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Tanzania and Zambia each have trade-reducing policies in their exportable sub-sector, 
which leads to a higher TRI estimate for them in Figure 4 than in Figure 2.  
As mentioned in footnote 3, welfare reduction indexes (WRIs) are also 
included in the AC database, and KNO estimate a comparable measure in their work 
(see, for example, World Bank 2007, Appendix Table A.3.a). In the AC estimates, 
since both tariffs and export subsidies have welfare-reducing effects, one does not see 
the offsetting effects in their WRI that are present above in their TRI. Instead there is 
a compounding effect when exportables are added to the product set. This can be seen 
in Figure 5, where Switzerland has one of the highest WRI estimates for all covered 
tradables. True, the WRI measure fails to capture potential welfare benefits from 




of disease, and for that reason the WRIs may be overstated. But on the other hand 
they are understated to the extent that they are based on broad aggregate commodity 





In recent years very considerable progress has been made in answering the question: 
how much do agricultural policies restrict trade? The two World Bank studies 
surveyed here have approached the question from different angles, each producing 
complementary results as to the restrictiveness of import-competing agriculture in 
developed and developing countries in the 2000s. The Anderson and Croser (2009) 
estimates have the benefit of being part of a longer time-series of estimates, giving 
historical context to the current policy position. The import-competing sub-sector 
estimates can be compared to estimates for the other sub-sectors of agriculture 
(exportables and nontradables), thereby offering further insight into the antitrade bias 
in different countries’ policies. The Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008) indexes, 
constructed from a somewhat different methodology and dataset, have the benefit of 
allowing for a comparison between the trade restrictiveness of agricultural and 
manufacturing import-competing policies, offering insight into the extent of the 
sectoral bias in protectionist national trade policies (usually favoring agriculture). The 
KNO estimates are more theoretically precise than the AC estimates because they are 
based on a more disaggregated dataset and they capture the differential responses of 
various commodity trades to a given policy distortion through the inclusion of price 
elasticity data. Because the KNO estimates are based on a routinely amended 
UNCTAD data source, they can be regularly updated at low cost by the World Bank 
or other institutions.  
We have shown that the level of disaggregation of the distortions data, the 
proportion of the sector included in the aggregation, and the types of policy 
instruments included in the analysis are all important determinants of indices of 
agricultural trade restrictiveness. The more prevalent are NTMs, the more difficult it 
will be to avoid domestic-to-border price comparisons to get an accurate measure. But 
such price comparison studies need to include not only products important in 




not be produced domestically (such as tropical products in temperate countries, and 
conversely). Such price comparison studies are laborious and therefore expensive. 
Nonetheless, they are being undertaken regularly by the OECD for gradually more 
and more countries, including (from 2010) for a sample of African countries under a 
new joint project with the FAO and national governments funded by the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation. Adding TRIs to the list of calculated indicators by the 
OECD would enrich the policy analysis that will be possible with those estimates, and 
without requiring any more information that is currently needed to estimate 
NRAs/CTEs or PSE/CSEs if one is willing to adopt some restrictive assumptions 
about price elasticities. 
  One final point: the TRI, with its inclusion of export sub-sectors, will be 
especially useful when assessing the restrictiveness of policy responses to spikes in 
international food prices, as in 2008 when many developing countries placed 
restrictions on exports of food. Efforts are currently under way to update the 
Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) and Anderson and Croser (2009) databases to 
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Figure 1: Trade reduction indexes for the agricultural sector’s import-competing and 
exportables sub-sector and overall, all covered tradable farm products, 1960 to 2007 
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Source: Anderson and Croser (2009). 
Note: Regional aggregates are weighted using the average of the value of production 





Figure 2: Trade reduction indexes for the agricultural sector’s import-competing sub-




(a) High-income and transition economies 
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Figure 2 (continued): Trade reduction indexes for the agricultural sector’s import-
competing sub-sector, selected focus countries, 2000–04
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(b) Developing countries 
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Sources: Anderson and Croser (2009) and Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008).  
a. The Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga estimate for each country is for a single year in the 





Figure 3: Trade reduction indexes for the agricultural and manufacturing sub-sectors, 
selected focus countries, mid-2000s
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(a) High-income and transition economies 
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Figure 3 (continued) Trade reduction indexes for the agricultural and manufacturing 
sub-sectors, selected focus countries, mid-2000s
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(b) Developing countries 
 


























Kee et al. OTRI, tariffs & NTMs, agriculture
Kee et al. OTRI, tariffs & NTMs, manufacturing
 
Source: Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008).  
a. The for each country is for a single year in the mid-2000s for which the most recent 





Figure 4: Trade reduction indexes for the agricultural import-competing sub-sector 




(a) High-income and transition economies 
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Figure 4 (continued): Trade reduction indexes for the agricultural import-competing 




(b) Developing countries 
 


























Kee et al. OTRI, tariffs & NTMs
Anderson and Croser TRI, all covered tradables
 
Source: Anderson and Croser (2009). 
a. The Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga estimate for each country is for a single year in the 








































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Anderson and Croser (2009). 
 